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Introduction 
On July 1 2010, the Minister of Communications Steven Joyce announced fundamental changes 
to the structure and regulation of the New Zealand Government‟s Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative. 
The changes were deemed necessary in order to achieve uptake targets sufficient to underpin the 
business case for both government and private sector investment.  
 
Previous ISCR research has identified critical weaknesses in the original proposal arising from 
two factors:  
 the mandatory separation boundaries between firms providing retail, dark-fibre and other 
services posed impediments to the ability of the fibre infrastructure firms to access 
economies of scale in production essential to ensuring that the services could be produced 
as cheaply as possible (and thereby facilitate the rapid substitution by existing broadband 
consumers away from their existing providers‟ technologies that was essential to the 
financial success of the project); and 
 the lack of clarity regarding the anticipated role of incumbent copper provider Telecom 
New Zealand led to substantial uncertainty as to the shape of future competitive 
interaction, threatening the returns and hence the willingness to invest for Telecom, the 
new fibre firms and other infrastructure operators offering broadband services on 
alternative technologies. 
 
This Comment assesses the extent to which the July 1 changes address these fundamental 
concerns. In summary, it is found that whilst the changes would appear to enable progress 
towards the ability to access productive scale efficiencies and competitive pricing structures that 
will induce some degree of substitution, lack of clarity about the future competitive environment 
still exposes investors in the sector to significant uncertainties and potential perverse outcomes. 
Consequently, overall sector investment will likely be inhibited, and the evolution of broadband 
sector institutions substantially constrained. This situation is likely to prevail as long as it remains 
unclear whether the Government‟s overarching policy for ongoing evolution of broadband 
markets in New Zealand is predicated upon the pursuit of open competition between a variety of 
(publicly and/or privately-owned) broadband networks of various technological forms, or the re-
establishment of a single technology, government-mandated, nationwide monopoly network 
infrastructure providing homogeneous inputs to a range of retailers competing only in respect to 
the services offered on the top of those inputs.   
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1. The Proposal and Subsequent Changes 
The New Zealand Government‟s Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative (UFBI) commits up to $1.35 
billion to accelerate the construction of an open-access fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) infrastructure 
that will reach 75 percent of New Zealanders over ten years
1
. It is the Government‟s expectation 
that its investment will be at least matched by private sector funding, deployed by way of a co-
investment model overseen by the crown-owned company Crown Fibre Holdings Limited (CFH). 
In September 2009 the Government issued its „final‟ proposal for the UFBI, and invited proposals 
for participation (via the „Invitation To Participate‟, or ITP) from prospective private sector 
partners in the formation of Local Fibre Companies (LFCs) which would construct and operate 
dark-fibre infrastructure.  
 
A key component of the initial model was structural separation between various components of 
the FTTH production chain. Government funding would be applied only to LFCs, and specifically 
for the construction of Layer 1 dark-fibre infrastructure. LFCs could optionally operate 
structurally-separated Layer 2 wholesale operations. Layer 3 firms engaged in retailing could 
integrate upstream into Layer 2 wholesale operations where dark-fibre connections are converted 
into a range of speed-differentiated data transmission (bitstream) services. However firms 
operating at Layers 2 and/or 3 would be unable to have a controlling interest in LFCs (see Figure 
1, UFBI New Zealand model). By January 29 2010, Crown Fibre Holdings had received 33 
separate proposals from 18 individual respondents
2
.  
 
On 1 July 2010, in response to feedback from the industry and firms responding to the invitation 
to participate, the Minister of Communications announced changes to the proposed model and the 
obligations of the proposed LFCs
3
. A revised invitation to participate was released on July 5
4
, 
with an overview of the amendments being provided on July 8
5
. Only respondents to the initial 
ITP have been invited to submit revised proposals. It is anticipated that CFH will be making 
recommendations on preferred partners to Cabinet by October 2010.  
 
  
                                                     
1
 The initiative also allocates $150m for making schools broadband ready, making a headline total of 
$1.5bn. See: http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/72814/SOI-2009-2013-Crown-Fibre-Holdings.pdf.  
2
 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____41902.aspx  
3
 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ufb+model+amendments+announced  
4
 http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/73847/Participant-Notice-amending-ITP.pdf  
5
 http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/73850/Ultra-
fast%20Broadband%20Initiative%20overview%20of%20amendments.pdf  
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Figure 1. Comparison of New Zealand and Australian Fibre Broadband Proposals
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The July UFBI changes are not minor. They constitute a substantial change to all of the nature of 
the products to be offered by the local fibre partnership firms, the firm and industry structure 
under which they will be delivered, and the governance arrangements overseeing their provision
6
 
(see Figure 1, UFBI 2.0 New Zealand Model 2010-2019).  
 
LFCs must now provide Layer 2 services across all parts of the network – that is, speed-
differentiated bitstream access rather than homogeneous dark-fibre connections – with a more 
restricted dark-fibre offering („point-to-point‟) required to be provided only to business customers. 
Layer 1 services will now be required to be supplied on a „non-discrimination‟ open access 
standard (identical services must be supplied to all customers seeking them at identical terms) 
rather than the more rigorous „equivalence of inputs‟ standards (where the firm must supply third-
party access seekers products and services on exactly the same terms and conditions as it supplies 
to its own downstream operations). Whilst the firm may choose to offer „unbundled‟ access to 
„point-to-multipoint‟ Layer 1 services at any time, it will not become mandatory for LFCs to 
supply such services until 31 December 2019
7
.  
 
The changes mean that the effective structural separation boundary for the fibre network now sits 
between Layers 2 and 3 rather than between Layers 1 and 2 (Figure 1). In the absence of 
regulated unbundled point-to-multipoint Layer 1 access, the potential no longer exists for 
investment in stand-alone Layer 2 infrastructure. Whereas under the original proposals Layer 2 
and 3 operators could fully vertically integrate, Layer 3 operators will now be restricted to 
holding only a non-controlling interest in any part of the underlying infrastructure, with the 
prospect of participating in UFBI infrastructure ownership available to them only if they have 
already responded as a party to the invitation to participate. 
 
Moreover, the regulatory arrangements have changed, with LFCs being granted a period of 
regulatory forbearance from Telecommunications Commission intervention on price and non-
price terms until 31 December 2019. Instead, fibre service prices will be determined by 
commercial negotiations following the tender process overseen by CFH. The changes do not alter 
the proposed competitive positioning of the new fibre networks vis-à-vis the broadband networks 
of Telecom New Zealand or other fixed-line broadband infrastructure operators such as 
TelstraClear and CityLink, or the „unbundling‟ firms who have invested in equipment to provide 
                                                     
6
 To the extent that the new proposal represents a „step-change‟ warranting our describing it „UFBI 2.0‟.  
7
 The requirement that LFCs provide an unbundled Layer 1 product on an equivalence of inputs basis from 
31 December 2019 means that the UFBI 2.0 structure will then revert to the original UFBI structure. 
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services using Telecom‟s infrastructure following the implementation of local loop unbundling. 
The position of Telecom is still left open, albeit with the acknowledgement that if Telecom 
became a partner in an LFC, this could weaken infrastructure competition from the copper 
network, which will continue to be subject to regulations and price control from the 
Telecommunications Commission. 
 
The primary reasons cited for the changes are the need for LFCs to be able to offer a range of 
differentiated products at both Layers 1 and 2, to be able to price these products differently in 
order to be able to attract customers from the copper network to fibre products, and not to be 
burdened with “unnecessary regulation” whilst they are in their infancy. It is also claimed that the 
changes address the risk that vertical integration between Layer 2 and 3 operators could create a 
retail player able to capture market power through a bottleneck at Layer 2.  
2. Evaluating the Changes using ISCR Research 
ISCR research published in March
8
, May
9
 and June
10
 2010 has posed some important competition 
and governance questions for policymakers, as well as highlighting institutional design issues in 
the original UFBI that pose considerable challenges to the government‟s ability to achieve its 
fibre infrastructure implementation and uptake objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner.  
 
The first research presentation identified the lack of clarity in the original UFBI proposal 
regarding the type of competitive environment into which the government wishes the new fibre 
network to be deployed: 
 one predicated upon „infrastructure competition‟ where different network technologies 
(copper, fibre, cable
11
, fixed wireless, cellular etc.) compete at the network level for 
broadband customers using differentiated network products and services; or 
 one where it is presumed a single specific network (fibre or copper) will dominate all 
others, to the extent that competition in the broadband market is limited predominantly to 
                                                     
8
 Howell, B. (2010). Governments in the Telco Business: Prudential Investment or Pursuing Non-economic 
Purposes? Presentation at ISCR, Wellington, New Zealand. March 31, 2010. Available at 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f550,15838/15838_Feb_25_2010_CIS.pdf. 
9
 Howell, B. & Heatley, D. (2010). Presentation to Internet New Zealand Ultrafast Broadband Workshop. 
May 19. New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation. Available at: 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/n568.html. 
10
 Heatley, D. & Howell, B. (2010). Structural Separation and Prospects for Welfare-Enhancing Price 
Discrimination in a New ‘Natural Monopoly’ Network: comparing fibre broadband proposals in Australia 
and New Zealand. Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and 
Regulation. 26 June. Available from http://www.iscr.org.nz/n580.html.  
11
 Using hybrid fibre-coaxial (HFC) technology. 
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„services-based competition‟ where downstream providers compete to provide 
differentiated services based upon the (regulated) supply of identical (homogeneous) 
upstream network infrastructure products supplied by a single network operator
12
. 
 
The optimal industry structure and regulatory provisions necessary to encourage the development 
of these very different patterns of competitive interaction are fundamentally different. In the 
absence of a clear indication of the government‟s intentions on the development of sector 
competition policy, the institutions (firm, industry, government, regulatory, contractual, etc.) 
necessary to enable effective interactions to occur within the sector can neither be designed nor 
evolve in a manner supportive of the delivery of a coherent set of sector outcomes.  
 
The latter research pieces note the significant limitations that structural separation and the 
requirement to provide undifferentiated dark-fibre at a single price place upon the ability of the 
government-funded fibre-providing LFCs to engage in welfare-enhancing price discrimination 
that enables access to scale economies in production that will lead to lower production costs 
overall and faster uptake of fibre connections. This compares unfavourably with the Australian 
NBNCo proposal, where the (vertically integrated Layer 1/2) fibre operator is specifically 
mandated to provide a range of speed-differentiated products at a variety of prices
13
.  
 
All three research pieces also identify the competitive disadvantages that will be faced by a fibre 
operator required to compete for existing broadband customers against the customers‟ existing 
(lower-cost) broadband infrastructure providers, given the lack of compelling highly-valued 
applications currently requiring the high-speed capacities of the new networks. The third paper 
notes that the cost of providing equivalent services will be higher per connection, and the 
likelihood of achieving financial self-sustainability much lower for New Zealand‟s UFBI than for 
Australia‟s NBNCo proposal, where infrastructure competition from existing fixed-line network 
operators is effectively eliminated by the agreement between the Government and Telstra to co-
operate on the migration of customers between networks
14
. In particular, it notes the degree of 
rigidity of the original New Zealand model, which imposes three-layer structural separation from 
the very outset, thereby denying benefits of integration between Layers 1 and 2 during the initial 
                                                     
12
 For a discussion of these different types of competition, see Grajek, M., & Roller, L-H., (2009). 
Regulation and investment in network industries: evidence from European telecoms. ESMT Working Paper 
09-004. Available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448666. 
13
 http://www.dbcde.gov.au/broadband/national_broadband_network 
14
 Ibid. 
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stages of network deployment, compared to the Australian model, which allowed for an evolution 
from a model whereby separation is required between Layers 2 and 3 during the initial stages, but 
where it was envisaged that the industry would evolve over time towards the three-layer 
separation model as originally prescribed for New Zealand.  
2.1 UFBI 2.0: ‘Australian’ Separation Boundaries and Industry Evolution 
The July changes to the UFBI have adjusted the mandatory structural separation boundaries so 
that they now sit between Layers 2 and 3, the same point as those proposed for Australia‟s 
NBNCo. Figure 1 illustrates the comparison between the original and revised New Zealand UFBI 
arrangements and those proposed for Australia‟s NBN. The similarities between the revised New 
Zealand proposals (UFBI 2.0) and the Australian NBN model are striking, even to the extent of 
the period of regulatory forbearance granted (2018 in Australia, 2019 in New Zealand). 
Consequently, the substantial relative structural disadvantages of the original New Zealand 
proposal identified in the third ISCR paper have been largely eliminated. Average costs per 
connection should be lower – and uptake targets more likely to be achieved – as a consequence of 
the changes.  
 
LFCs will now have the ability to offer a range of differentiated products, sold at different prices 
set by commercial negotiation rather than regulation, and set in such a manner that to a 
considerable degree, strategic pricing can be used to enable the fibre operators to access cost-
reducing scale economies
15
. LFCs will now have the potential to discount the prices of their low-
speed, low quality product offerings below cost – and importantly, below the regulated prices set 
by the Telecommunications Commission for equivalent quality services offered by Telecom – in 
order to accelerate customer substitution from copper to the fibre network. However, the extent to 
which such discounting will be possible will be constrained by the extent to which prices 
substantially above cost can be charged for high-speed, higher-quality services – a question that 
still remains moot given the lack of compelling evidence that consumers are prepared to pay 
substantial premium for faster services in the absence of new, highly-valued applications that can 
only operate satisfactorily on the faster services
16
, and other factors discussed below in subsection 
2.4. 
                                                     
15
 Albeit that as separation precludes the network operator from having a commercial relationship with the 
end consumer, these product variants and prices will not be able to be set optimally to match end consumer 
preferences, but will have to be set relying upon supposition and Layer 3 retailers‟ willingness to pay as a 
proxy for underlying consumer preferences – a restriction that also attends the Australian NBN model.  
16
 Howell, B. & Grimes, A. (2010). Productivity Questions for Public Sector Fast Fibre Network Financiers. 
Communications and Strategies. 78: 127-45.  
http://www.iscr.org.nz -- 9 -- 
iscr@vuw.ac.nz 
 
The change in separation boundaries is accompanied by a change in the approach towards sector 
governance and likely institutional evolution. Rather than imposing a rigid three-layer separation 
model better suited to the regulation of a mature network technology that is already widely 
diffused, the amended proposal allows for an evolution in industry structure from fully integrated 
Layer 1 and 2 firms at the outset to functionally separate firms offering discrete Layer 1 and 
Layer 2 services by 31 December 2019. Changes in industry conditions as fibre technology 
diffuses will now determine the optimal timing for firms to alter pricing and product variants, and 
to begin to offer point-to-multipoint dark-fibre services. Regulatory forbearance reinforces the 
autonomy of the firms in making these decisions based upon commercial and not regulatory 
imperatives.  
 
These changes appear to provide greater certainty for investors than under the original proposal, 
so might be expected to increase the willingness of private sector partners to invest. Furthermore, 
individual investment decisions will be able to be implemented in a more-timely manner, without 
having to undergo the delays and uncertainties associated with regulatory processes. However, it 
is noted that the mandatory separation of Layer 3 providers in both the Australian NBN and New 
Zealand UFBI 2.0 proposals still impedes the passing through of the proceeds of retail-level price 
discrimination to infrastructure operators, so the average costs of connection under both proposals 
will be higher (and diffusion lower) than for the case of a fully integrated operator. It will still be 
possible for Layer 3 operators to use bundles of applications and network services to finely 
segment and selectively target customers on their willingness to pay, and extract as profits at least 
some of the premium that could otherwise be used to offset infrastructure costs, as indicated in 
the third ISCR paper. 
2.2 Inducing Participation: Will UFBI 2.0 Processes Guarantee the Best Partners? 
The UFBI 2.0 proposals ameliorate some of the risks required to be borne by private sector 
investors under the original UFBI terms. However, only original respondents to the invitation to 
participate have been invited to submit revised proposals
17
. Whilst this restriction may speed up 
the process of assessing proposals and facilitate meeting the October 2010 timeline for submitting 
recommendations to Cabinet of the preferred investment partners, it is highly discriminatory 
given the very substantial alterations to both the industry structure and business case viability that 
UFBI 2.0 embodies. To exclude new responses risks foreclosing a potential investor with a 
                                                     
17
 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____44048.aspx  
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superior offer under the new arrangements who (rationally) refrained from participating in the 
original invitation due to its restrictive and potentially financially unviable business case for 
stand-alone Layer 1 services.  
 
For example, as illustrated in the third ISCR paper, while the UFBI allowed an LFC to optionally 
operate a (structurally separate) Layer 2 wholesaler, such a provider would have been at a 
significant competitive disadvantage relative to Layer 2 operators subject to less regulation and 
lower capital risk, and particularly vulnerable to integrated Layer 2/3 operators. Potential 
investors may have preferred to eschew Layer 1 involvement under the previous arrangements, 
instead waiting until they could enter the market as separate Layer 2 or Layer 2/3 operators. 
However, by removing regulated access to point-to-multipoint dark-fibre connections, UFBI 2.0 
effectively eliminates stand-alone Layer 2 and integrated Layer 2/3 operators
18
. Whilst it is still 
possible for these firms to become stand-alone Layer 3 operators, such operations require 
substantially less investment and a different skill set than required of Layer 2 operators. Any such 
potential investment or proprietary skills that could have been applied to Layer 2 investment 
under the UFBI now cannot be deployed independently under UFBI 2.0. They can only be 
applied in (subsequent) partnership with existing responders to the UFBI invitation to participate, 
to the ultimate detriment of the UFBI 2.0 competitive tendering process and the potential 
effectiveness of the government‟s financial contribution.  
 
It is not clear, therefore, that the UFBI 2.0 resubmission process will enable selection of the best 
potential partners to build and operate the combined Layer 1 and 2 networks.  
2.3 ‘Australian Structure’ in a ‘New Zealand Competitive Environment’  
Figure 1 shows that whilst the UFBI 2.0 structural arrangements closely parallel those of the 
Australian NBN, the competitive position will be very different. As the third ISCR paper 
identifies, the Australian NBN model effectively insulates the fibre operator from competing 
fixed-line providers via the deal with Telstra to lease and/or purchase the legacy copper network, 
provisions to overbuild and undercut competing cable networks and the effective prohibition of 
competing fibre networks. However, the New Zealand UFBI 2.0 proposals still fail to make clear 
the anticipated competitive position of Telecom New Zealand, its local loop unbundling „partners‟  
(e.g. Orcon and Vodafone) who have invested in copper network assets, and other fixed-line 
infrastructure owners such as TelstraClear and CityLink.  
                                                     
18
 Stand-alone Layer 2 and integrated Layer 2/3 operators will gain access to the Layer 1 network on an 
„equivalence of inputs‟ basis after 31 December 2019.  
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At the nub of the issue is the failure to articulate the type of competition it is anticipated will 
develop (and will be fostered by competition and regulatory policy) in New Zealand following 
the deployment of fibre networks. Will it be infrastructure competition, between a range of 
networks technologies, advocated by the OECD as the desirable state of competitive affairs in 
liberalised, privatised broadband markets
19
, and observed in countries such as the United States, 
the Netherlands and Denmark, or services-based competition, with a single dominant network 
such has already been declared to be the policy objective in Australia? The direction is crucially 
important for providing some certainty to current and potential infrastructure investors as to the 
way competition in the broadband market will develop over the short and medium term.  
 
Whilst Australian market participants have certainty that migration from copper to the fibre 
network will be a centrally managed, government-mandated process, with the copper network 
shut down as soon as feasible in order to minimise duplication of fixed-line broadband 
infrastructures (i.e. there will be only services-based competition in the fixed-line broadband 
market), it is still not clear whether New Zealand LFCs will be competing with the copper 
network investors or collaborating with them. This materially influences the likely achievable 
market share and returns available to fibre investors. It also affects the investment scenarios 
facing all existing infrastructure operators. Whilst ongoing uncertainty for Telecom shareholders 
is reflected in a very low share price, the uncertainty extends also to other investors, for example 
unbundling entrants such as Orcon and Vodafone. Should they invest more in exchange and sub-
loop unbundling, and if so, where should they invest? What will occur if Telecom is successful in 
becoming an LFC partner in some locations and not others? Will their existing investments 
become stranded if Telecom does a deal with the government as has been done with Telstra in 
Australia? Likewise, fixed infrastructure owners such as TelstraClear and even mobile and 
wireless operators such as Vodafone and Woosh face different competitive scenarios depending 
upon whether they will face one (fibre) or two (fibre and copper) fixed-line network rivals. Such 
uncertainty inevitably increases the risks associated with investment and strategic decision-
making for all such operators, and consequently constrains both investment and sector evolution.  
 
Although the New Zealand structures replicate the Australian ones, as UFBI 2.0 provides no 
further clarification as to the form of competition that is being pursued, the New Zealand 
                                                     
19
 OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Working party on Telecommunications and 
Information Services Policy (2001). The Development of Broadband Access in OECD Countries. 
DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2001)2/Final.  
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competitive environment remains very different from its trans-Tasman counterpart. The greater 
uncertainties in the New Zealand case are costly (both relatively and absolutely), and will be 
resolved only when there is clarification of the type of competition policy envisaged – 
infrastructure or services.  
2.4 Ongoing Copper Regulation Undoes Benefits of UFBI 2.0 Structural Changes 
It is noted that under the original UFBI arrangements (Figure 1), the separation boundaries 
imposed on fibre firms paralleled those imposed upon Telecom. It was also proposed that 
regulatory responsibility for both Telecom and the LFCs would lie with the Telecommunications 
Commission. However, the UFBI 2.0 arrangements see Telecom continuing to be subject to 
three-way separation and ongoing regulated access provisions overseen by the Commission, 
which is unable to intervene in the fibre market until 2020 regardless of the ways in which 
competitive interaction develops across a broadband market served by both technologies. 
Meanwhile, unregulated fibre providers and their downstream partners face less rigid separation 
mandates and no fear of price controls being imposed. The disjunction of both separation 
boundaries and regulatory oversight leads to the potential for fragmentation of industry 
governance, to the detriment of both consumers and the firms concerned. 
 
Fragmentation of sector governance oversight is potentially very costly and likely to distort the 
pattern of competitive interaction that ensues. For example, Telecom‟s network arm Chorus is 
required to provide services at cost-based regulated prices to its downstream partners (both 
proprietary and access-seekers). Under its separation undertakings, Telecom is unable to engage 
in price discrimination, either between itself and its downstream firm, or between or against its 
wholesale customers
20
. This restriction substantially limits the ability of Chorus and its 
unbundling partners (including Telecom Retail and Telecom Wholesale) to engage in the same 
price discrimination possible for the vertically integrated Layer 1/2 LFCs. Whilst the fibre 
company can compete aggressively by cutting prices for low-end services cross-subsidised by 
prices charged above cost for high-end services, the copper operators do not have such flexibility 
as they are unable to make individual or collective contractual agreements with Chorus to set 
charges on its platform in this manner in order enable the copper network to compete „on a level 
playing field‟ with the fibre network (indeed, the entire purpose of functional and structural 
separation is to defeat the ability of a network operator to engage in such cross-subsidisation). 
The copper network and all its investors thus appear to be at a substantial competitive 
                                                     
20
 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/regulated-industries-media-releases/detail/2010/telecom-settles-over-
wholesale-loyalty-offer-1-6-million-to-be-paid-in-compensation  
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disadvantage relative to the LFCs unless the regulatory provisions and separation undertakings 
imposed on Telecom are also relaxed.  
 
Furthermore, price regulation and separation undertakings on the copper network ultimately 
effectively constrain the ability for fibre operators to engage in aggressive price discrimination to 
accelerate substitution of customers from copper to fibre networks in the first place. Whilst 
Chorus and its partners may be unable to match low-end discounts under the current separation 
undertakings and price regulations, they will be able to (and indeed under cost-based price 
regulation obligated to) undercut the above-cost prices that it will be necessary for the fibre 
operators to charge in order to be able to engage in price discrimination in the first place. 
Consequently, with lower high-end prices, the copper operators will likely end up with a 
disproportionately large share of the high-valuing customers prepared to pay a premium for high 
quality services
21
, leaving the fibre operators with a disproportionately large share of low-
spending (discounted) customers, and therefore unable to extract sufficient price premia from 
high-valuing customers to balance the costs of discounting. Ongoing regulation of the (legacy) 
copper network means prices for low-end products on fibre cannot be discounted to the extent 
that would be desirable to maximise scale economies, effectively undoing much of the benefit of 
price discrimination enabled by the change in the separation boundaries that comprise the 
substance of the UFBI 2.0 changes.  
 
The perverse outcome highlights the „problem‟ of imposing structural separation, and indeed 
many other regulatory provisions of any kind on networks that are not truly natural monopolies
22
. 
Separation artificially „tilts the competitive playing field‟ against the separated operator wherever 
there is any form of infrastructure competition available
23
. Where two structurally-separated 
networks with boundaries drawn at different layers compete with each other, then the outcome 
will inevitably be contrary to the pursuit of efficiency – whether in its static or dynamic 
components – as well as leading to severely distorted patterns of competitive interaction as each 
party seeks to gain an advantage by exploiting loopholes created by the regulations
24
.  
                                                     
21
 At least those customers who can be served by VDSL, which is expected to be offering 40Mbps to 60% 
of the population before the UFBI rollout begins. See: Communications Day June 17, 2010, p.1. 
22
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Furthermore, subjecting an existing (legacy) network facing competition from a superseding 
network technology to regulation appears somewhat perverse when it is believed that the 
superseding technology will be unconditionally dominant in the market due to its superior 
characteristics. If the new network is in fact unconditionally dominant, then it will quickly erode 
any market power held by the legacy network, making ongoing regulation of the legacy network 
redundant. If the new network is not unconditionally dominant (or not yet unconditionally 
dominant though it might be at some stage in the future), then why is the government subsidising 
its entry into an already heavily regulated market at the current point in time in the first place? 
Such a policy risks introducing the technology „too early‟, and therefore imposing costs that 
would not be incurred if the option was instead exercised to defer investment until further 
evidence emerges of the likely timing at which the network will become dominant.   
 
Even aside from the question of technological dominance, it begs the question of what policy 
objective the government is intending to address with its investment. If the intention is to it is to 
provide infrastructure competition for the incumbent that would not occur naturally (as evidenced 
by the government‟s action as proposed investor), then why continue to regulate the incumbent as 
if it is facing no infrastructure competition (i.e. persevering with a regulatory regime predicated 
on the pursuit of a services-based competition policy)?
25
 If the intention is to accelerate the rate at 
which the (government-selected) subsidised technology supersedes the legacy technology, then 
why persist with a regulatory policy that increases competition on the legacy network, and by 
extension, increases the extent of competition posed for the superseding network by the legacy 
network?  Such increased competition will inevitably delay the diffusion of the new network by 
reducing its market share, thereby defeating the original purpose fur the investment of pursuing 
an earlier roll-out. It would be simpler, cheaper and provide more certainty that the government‟s 
objective would be delivered to instead pursue the Australian Government‟s strategy of 
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abandoning all pretence of industry engagement in competition on the legacy network by 
acquiring it and managing its closure, in the manner of a centrally-planned project
26
.  
 
The scenario highlighted in this subsection serves to underscore the importance of being clear 
about exactly which type of competition the government wishes to foster. The institutional 
requirements for the development of infrastructure competition are radically different from those 
required for services-based competition.  
 
The apparent inconsistencies between the proposed New Zealand institutions and the purported 
project objectives suggest that there is still a considerable lack of clarity about exactly what the 
government is endeavouring to achieve in regard to both its investment and competition policy. 
This is reflected in the bifurcation of oversight responsibilities. Whilst the Telecommunications 
Commission is charged with the continuing regulation of the legacy infrastructure, if there is to be 
any regulatory restraint imposed upon the fibre infrastructure before 2020, it would appear to be 
under the purview of Crown Fibre Holdings and its contractual arrangements with the LFCs and 
LFC partner firms
27
. There will likely be further pressures placed on these arrangements as 
wireless broadband technologies increase in capability and become credible substitutes to fixed-
line services. The potential exists for a severe disjunction in industry governance to emerge, 
creating further confusion in the absence of a clear statement of the overarching competition 
policy for the broadband sector as a whole (as opposed to individual objectives in relation to 
specific infrastructures). It would be remarkable indeed if the arrangements as proposed did not 
further exacerbate uncertainty and thereby compromise the potential of the New Zealand 
broadband market to evolve in a manner that maximises its potential to contribute to the overall 
welfare of the New Zealand economy. 
 
3. Conclusion 
On first examination, UFBI 2.0 appears to be an improvement over its predecessor from the 
perspective of prospective partners seeking to invest, as the potential for the practice of price 
discrimination suggests that the likelihood that customers will migrate to it from the legacy 
copper network is increased. However, it is still far from clear that the changes will be conducive 
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to the development over time of either a robust and economically sustainable fibre network, or a 
wider broadband market that will support ongoing dynamic investment over a range of competing 
infrastructure platforms (both fixed and mobile) for the benefit of the New Zealand economy. 
Although LFCs now have access to the benefits of product and price discrimination, failure to 
allow new parties to register responses to the ITP potentially shuts out investors now better placed 
to participate. Thus, greater certainty for existing prospective investors comes at the expense of 
the participation of others.  
 
As there is still no clarity with respect to overarching sector competition policy objectives 
(infrastructure competition or services-based competition) there is still considerable confusion 
about the role to be played by investors in copper and other broadband networks. The continued 
regulation of legacy copper networks as if they face no infrastructure competition at the same 
time as competing fibre operators are relieved of some of the burdens of regulatory oversight and 
structural separation in order to enable them to compete aggressively with copper providers 
threatens to facilitate fragmentation of industry-wide broadband sector competition policy. 
Without any overt statements of policy to govern the transition between network types, strict 
adherence to legacy regulatory policies risks invoking a series of strategic competitive responses 
from copper and fibre operators that have the potential to undermine the ability for fibre operators 
to capitalise upon the product and price discrimination benefits enabled by the UFBI amendments. 
At worst, if fibre operators attempt to engage in aggressive price-based competition to capture a 
high volume of low-value broadband customers, the result could be a perverse case of adverse 
selection where the fibre network is exposed to financial failure, whilst the copper network retains 
high-value customers and becomes more profitable. At best, if fibre operators perceive the 
bifurcation to be a real risk, then they will refrain from aggressive competition based upon price 
discrimination, and the market equilibrium will revert to a smaller number of fibre connections 
being sold, higher average costs, and a reversion to the very problems that the recent changes 
sought to address.  
 
The ultimate viability of the Government‟s fibre investment project will turn on some binding 
decisions being made about the shape of future competition, and developing a policy and 
regulatory regime that enables the future networks to be delivered as efficiently as possible. In the 
case of Australia, the government has seized the initiative and determined that there will be only 
one fixed network in the medium term, and that will be fibre. All pretence of maintaining 
competitive access to the copper network, or competitive pressure from the copper network on the 
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fibre network has been dismissed. This stance enables the fibre investment to proceed with 
reasonable certainty that the roll-out objectives will be achieved, albeit by replacing thirty years 
of policy seeking to break the power of a regulated monopoly provider with the installation of yet 
another regulated monopoly provider.  Whilst clarity and policy consistency has been achieved in 
the Australian case (access regulation policy instruments are consistent with the pursuit of 
services competition), there is no assurance that the fibre network will be deployed at the least 
cost overall to Australian consumers – there may still be some value in the option of waiting for 
further information before deploying the network.   
 
New Zealand policy makers can choose to implement the same competition policy as Australia, 
just as they have chosen to adopt the same separation structures. Alternatively they can adopt an 
infrastructure-neutral competition policy based upon truly competing network infrastructures.  
However, the second policy is incompatible with the imposition of separation mandates on either 
or both of the networks. An infrastructure-neutral policy would require a relaxation of existing 
regulatory and separation mandates on the copper network in order for infrastructure-based 
competition to be effective, regardless of who funds the new fibre infrastructure.  
 
Ultimately, if the new fibre infrastructure cannot be provided in a cost-effective manner (even 
with the advantages of government subsidies unavailable to competing networks) without 
compromising the pursuit of the competitive principles governing private sector investors in other 
networks, then it begs the question of whether it is a prudent for the government to engage in 
investing in the sector at all.  If the risks arising from uncertain demand are indeed so large that 
the private sector is refraining from investing, then perhaps the government should also take heed 
of the costly consequences of the „bad news principle‟ as it pertains to sunk investments in costly 
infrastructure: investing and then learning, once it is too late or too costly to withdraw, that it 
would have been better to have waited. 
